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Abstract
& Event-related potentials (ERPs) were used to investigate the
neural processes underlying the distinctiveness heuristic—
a response mode in which participants expect to remember
vivid details of an experience and make recognition decisions
based on this metacognitive expectation. One group of
participants studied pictures and auditory words; another
group studied visual and auditory words. Studied and novel
items were presented at test as words only, with all novel
items repeating after varying lags. ERP differences were seen
between the word and picture groups for both studied and
novel items. For the novel items, ERP differences were largest
in frontal and central midline electrodes. In separate analyses,
the picture group showed the greatest ERP differences
between item types in a parietally based component from
550 to 1000 msec, whereas the word group showed the
greatest differences in a frontally based component from 1000
to 2000 msec. The authors suggest that the distinctiveness
heuristic is a retrieval orientation that facilitates reliance upon
recollection to differentiate between item types. Although the
picture group can use this heuristic and its retrieval
orientation on the basis of recollection, the word group
must engage additional postretrieval processes to distinguish
between item types, reflecting the use of a different retrieval
orientation. &
INTRODUCTION
Although memory is often accurate, memory distortions
and false memories frequently occur (Schacter, 1996).
False recognition is one type of memory distortion that
has been recently studied in the laboratory. False rec-
ognition occurs when people incorrectly claim to have
previously encountered a novel word or event. During
the past several years, there has been growing inter-
est in procedures that reduce the occurrence of false
memories (see Schacter & Wiseman, in press; Dodson,
Koutstaal, & Schacter, 2000, for review). For example,
a number of experiments have observed reduced false
recognition of novel items that are semantically related
to previously studied items when the study and test
trials are repeated multiple times (Budson, Daffner,
Desikan, & Schacter, 2000; Kensinger & Schacter, 1999;
Schacter, Verfaellie, Anes, & Racine, 1998; McDermott,
1996).
Israel and Schacter (1997) investigated another meth-
od to reduce false recognition. They tested the idea that
if false recognition of semantically related words de-
pends upon participants’ reliance upon the common
semantic features or gist of the study list, then it should
be possible to reduce false recognition following study
conditions that promote encoding of distinctive infor-
mation about particular items. Israel and Schacter pre-
sented one group of young adults with lists of semantic
associates in which each word was presented auditorily
and was also accompanied by a corresponding picture. A
second group heard the same words auditorily, but
instead of an accompanying picture, they saw the visual
presentation of the word. Israel and Schacter found that
pictorial encoding yielded lower levels of false recogni-
tion of both semantically related and unrelated lures
than did word encoding alone.
In a follow-up study, Schacter, Israel, and Racine
(1999) found that participants showed a more conser-
vative response bias after picture encoding than after
word encoding. They suggested that this more conser-
vative response bias observed after picture encoding
may depend on a general shift in responding based on
participants’ metamemorial assessments of the kinds of
information they feel they should remember (Strack &
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with each of the presented words, participants in the
picture encoding condition used a general rule of
thumb, whereby they demanded access to detailed
pictorial information in order to support a positive
recognition decision; failure to gain access to such
distinctive information when tested with related lures
would tend to result in a negative recognition decision.
Importantly, Schacter, Israel, et al. (1999) argued that
suppression, on the basis of metamemorial assessments,
can function without access to specific information
regarding the particular items studied. They hypothe-
sized that the suppression of false recognition observed
in the picture encoding group thus relied on a general
expectation that a test item should elicit a vivid percep-
tual recollection if, indeed, it had been presented pre-
viously. Participants in the word encoding group, in
contrast, would not expect to retrieve distinctive repre-
sentations of previously studied items and are thus
much less likely to demand access to detailed recollec-
tions. Schacter, Israel, et al. referred to the hypothesized
rule of thumb used by the picture encoding group as
a ‘‘distinctiveness heuristic’’ (cf., Johnson, Hashtroudi,
& Lindsay, 1993; Chaiken, Lieberman, & Eagly, 1989;
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).
Additional studies have explored the distinctiveness
heuristic using other false recognition paradigms. Dod-
son and Schacter (2002a) used the repetition-lag para-
digm of Underwood and Freund (1970), later modified
by Jennings and Jacoby (1997). In the study of Dodson
and Schacter (2002a), participants first studied a list of
unrelated words. Although all participants heard the
words auditorily, some of the participants saw the
accompanying visual word, whereas others saw a picture
representing the word. At test, both groups were shown
studied and new words. Importantly, all of the new
words repeated after a varying lag of intervening words.
Participants were instructed to respond ‘‘old’’ to studied
words, and were specifically warned to avoid responding
‘‘old’’ to the repeated new words. As in the previous
studies (Schacter, Israel, et al., 1999; Israel & Schacter,
1997), Dodson and Schacter (2002a) found that those
who studied pictures showed lower rates of false recog-
nition than those who studied only words.
Whereas much is known about the cognitive pro-
cesses that are involved in using the distinctiveness
heuristic, Schacter and Wiseman (in press) note that
nothing is known about the corresponding brain pro-
cesses. Recent reports suggest that studying pictures can
changethe‘‘retrievalorientation’’oftheparticipants,com-
pared to studying words (Herron & Rugg, 2003; Robb &
Rugg, 2002). Rugg and Wilding (2000) describe retrieval
orientation as that which determines the particular form
of the processing that is applied to a cue at retrieval.
They also postulated that the neural correlates of the
retrieval orientation could be observed in a paradigm
which used identical retrieval cues to probe memory for
different kinds of information—if such cues were unre-
lated to the studied items (i.e., novel items in a recogni-
tion memory test). Robb and Rugg (2002) first suggested
that the distinctiveness heuristic could be explained as
the adoption of a particular retrieval orientation.
In the present study, we set out to examine the neural
correlate of the distinctiveness heuristic using event-
related potentials (ERPs). We hypothesized that if the
distinctiveness heuristic changed the retrieval orienta-
tion of the participants who studied pictures in compar-
ison to those who studied words, we should see ERP
differences between the two groups for the novel words
at test. Alternatively, if studying pictures was unrelated
to a change in retrieval orientation and instead only
increased the participants’ ability to remember the
specific details of a prior encounter with a particular
item (item-specific recollection) compared with those
who studied words, then we would expect to see ERP
differences between the two groups only for studied
items, and not for novel items.
We used a repetition-lag paradigm very similar to that
of Dodson and Schacter (2002b) to distinguish between
these two possibilities. During the study session par-
ticipants heard 100 words presented auditorily and
performed a syllable counting task. Half of the partic-
ipants also saw the word presented visually on the
screen; the other half saw a corresponding Snodgrass
and Vanderwart (1980) picture. At test, all participants
heard auditory words accompanied by the visual word.
In addition to the 100 studied words and 100 novel
words, 50 of the novel words were repeated after two
intervening words (lag 2) and the other 50 novel words
were repeated after 48 intervening words (lag 48). As
argued by Schacter, Israel, et al. (1999), we did not be-
lieve that an increase in item-specific recollection alone
could explain the results that have been attributed to
the distinctiveness heuristic (Budson, Dodson, Daffner,
& Schacter, 2005; Budson, Dodson, Vatner, et al., 2005;
Budson, Sitarski, Daffner, & Schacter, 2002; Dodson
& Schacter, 2002a, 2002b; Israel & Schacter, 1997).
We therefore predicted that we would find ERP differ-
ences between the word and picture groups for the
novel items. This finding would suggest that the distinc-
tiveness heuristic is a type of retrieval orientation which
participants may engage after studying pictures.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the proportion of
old responses with group (word, picture) as a between-
subjects variable and item type (study, novel, lag 2, lag
48) as a within-subjects variable yielded an effect of item
type [F(3,66) = 130.03, MSE = 0.009, p < .0005] and a
Group   Item type interaction [F(3,66) = 7.22, MSE =
0.009, p < .0005] (Table 1). The effect of group did not
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.103]. Post hoc one-way ANOVAs show that the interac-
tion is due to differences between the groups for novel
[F(1,22) = 6.45, MSE = 0.013, p = .019] and lag 48
[F(1,22) = 11.95, MSE = 0.024, p = .002] items, but not
for study or lag 2 items [Fs(1,22) < 1]) (Table 1). Thus,
the behavioral results show that studying pictures al-
lowed a reduction in false alarms to novel and lag
48 items, consistent with the use of the distinctiveness
heuristic. These results are consistent with the work of
Dodson and Schacter (2002a, 2002b).
We also performed signal detection analyses of the hit
and false alarm rates to novel and lag items, using d
0 as a
measure of sensitivity and C as a measure of response
bias, as described by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988). A
one-way ANOVA for d
0 revealed significant differences
between the groups, reflecting the greater ability of the
picture group to distinguish between study and novel
items [F(1,22) = 8.09, MSE = 0.263, p = .009] (Table 1).
There was a trend towards a difference between the
groups in the bias measure C [F(1,22) = 3.21, MSE =
0.213, p = .087] which, as suggested by the significant
difference in their false alarms to novel items, is attrib-
utable to the picture group being somewhat less likely to
respond ‘‘yes’’ compared with the word group.
ERP Overall Analyses
Grand-average ERP waveforms for all electrodes are
shown in Figure 1 for correct rejection of novel items
for the word and picture groups. Mean amplitudes were
analyzed for four intervals (150–300, 300–550, 550–1000,
Table 1. Proportion ‘‘Old’’ Responses to Study, Novel, and Repeated Lag Items by Word and Picture Encoding Condition
Encoding Condition Study Novel d
0 C Lag 2 Lag 48
Word, mean (SD) 0.60 (0.05) 0.24 (0.03) 1.04 0.41 0.15 (0.04) 0.37 (0.05)
Picture, mean (SD) 0.61 (0.06) 0.12 (0.03) 1.64 0.75 0.11 (0.04) 0.15 (0.04)
Figure 1. Grand-average ERP plots for all electrodes for correct rejection of novel items by group. Positive is plotted down, tics are every 200 msec.
Budson et al. 11831000–2000 msec) based upon visual inspection of the
waves and previous ERP recognition memory studies
which have identified a P200 component, an N400-like
component, a parietal component (also known as the
late positive component or LPC), and a late frontal
component (e.g., Curran, Schacter, Johnson, & Spinks,
2001). Midline and lateral sites were analyzed separately
and together with the lateral sites grouped in coronal
rows of three or four electrodes as described in the
Methods. These preliminary analyses revealed that the
general pattern of results showed an anterior to poste-
rior gradient, no difference between hemispheres, and
little difference between midline and lateral sites with
the midline sites showing the largest effects. The re-
mainder of the analyses was therefore performed with
the midline electrodes.
For the midline sites, we initially performed an overall
ANOVA with group (word, picture) as a between-subjects
variable and item type (correct responses to study,
novel, lag 2, lag 48) and electrode (Fz, Cz, Pz) as within-
subjects variables. For the first interval, there was a trend
toward an effect of group [F(1,22) = 3.58, MSE = 75.32,
p = .072]. For the second interval, there was a main
effect of item type [F(3,66) = 12.01, MSE = 9.97,
p < .0005] and an Item type   Electrode interaction
[F(6,132) = 9.59, MSE = 1.62, p < .0005]. For the third
interval, there was a main effect of item type [F(3,66) =
10.05, MSE = 10.78, p < .0005] and interactions of Item
type   Group [F(3,66) = 6.05, MSE = 10.78, p = .002]
and Item type   Electrode [F(6,132) = 5.23, MSE =
1.28, p = .001]; there was a weak trend toward the effect
of group [F(1,22) = 3.15, MSE = 95.34, p = .090]. For
the fourth interval, there was an effect of item type
[F(3,66) = 10.69, MSE = 7.67, p < .0005] and no
interactions. There were also effects of electrode (or
trends toward an effect) for all four intervals [first:
F(2,44) = 3.06, MSE = 4.52, p = .079; second: F(2,44) =
46.86, MSE = 8.69, p < .0005; third: F(2,44) = 21.06,
MSE = 10.31, p < .0005; fourth: F(2,44) = 24.95, MSE =
5.41, p < .0005]. In the first interval, the trend was
attributable to the tendency for Pz to be more positive
than Fz [F(1,22) = 3.57, MSE = 4.99, p = .072]. The
effect of electrode is present in the second and third
intervals because Pz was more positive than Fz [second:
F(1,22) = 57.95, MSE = 10.32, p < .0005; third: F(1,22) =
28.05, MSE = 11.21, p < .0005], whereas in the fourth
interval the effect is present because Fz was more posi-
tive than Pz [F(1,22) = 29.58, MSE = 6.20, p < .0005].
Old–new effects are of interest and were sought for each
interval. Only the third interval showed a weak trend
toward an Item type   Electrode interaction [F(2,44) =
2.64, MSE = 0.784, p = .095], which was attributable to a
significant old–new effect at Pz [F(1,22) = 4.40, MSE =
2.81, p = .048] due to the brain activity for ‘‘yes’’ re-
sponses to study items being more positive than that for
‘‘no’’ responses to novel items. Although a number of
additional post hoc tests could be performed to follow
up on these main effects and interactions, we will limit
our analyses to those that will shed light on the ques-
tions raised in the Introduction.
ERP Analyses of Separate Item Types by Group
Study Items
A series of ANOVAs with group (word, picture) as a
between-subjects variable and electrode (Fz, Cz, Pz) as a
within-subjects variable for ‘‘yes’’ responses to study
items revealed an effect of group for the third interval
[F(1,22) = 7.96, MSE = 29.36, p = .010] but not for the
second [F(1,22) = 2.59, MSE = 38.94, p = .122] or
fourth [F(1,22) = 2.04, MSE = 11.58, p = .168] intervals.
The analysis for the first interval revealed a near-
significant effect of group [F(1,22) = 3.84, MSE =
22.59, p = .063] and a significant Group   Electrode
interaction [F(2,44) = 8.28, MSE = 0.62, p = .002] attrib-
utable to effects of group at Cz [F(1,22) = 5.33, MSE =
7.69, p = .031] and Pz [F(1,22) = 6.28, MSE = 7.23,
p = .020]. These effects of group are present because in
the first and third intervals the study-yes responses of
the word group evoke more positive brain responses
than those of the picture group (Figure 2). There were
no other interactions between group and electrode.
Novel Items
Analogous ANOVAs for ‘‘no’’ responses to novel items
also revealed an effect of group for the first [F(1,22) =
4.58, MSE = 17.22, p = .044] and third [F(1,22) = 6.34,
MSE = 36.26, p = .020], but not second [F(1,22) = 2.71,
MSE = 42.90, p = .114] or fourth [F(1,22) = 1.01, MSE =
7.83, p = .324] intervals. There was also a near-significant
Group   Electrode interaction in the second interval
[F(2,44)=3.22,MSE=2.27,p=.061],whichwasnotpres-
ent in the first, third [Fs(2,44) < 1], or fourth [F(2,44) =
1.17, MSE = 1.66, p = .308] intervals. Post hoc tests
exploring this near-significant Group   Electrode inter-
action in the second interval and the effect of group in
the third interval reveal that the brain responses of
the word group were more positive than those of the
picturegroupatFz[F(1,22)=4.81,MSE=30.30,p=.039]
and Cz [F(1,22) = 5.42, MSE = 26.21, p = .029] but not
at Pz [F(1,22) = 3.05, MSE = 19.86, p = .095] (Figure 3).
Thus, the brain responses of the word group were
more positive when rejecting novel items than those
of the picture group (Figures 1, 2, and 3), consistent
with previous studies (Herron & Rugg, 2003; Robb &
Rugg, 2002).
Lag Items
In contrast to the results of the study and novel items,
t h eA N O V A sf o rt h e‘ ‘ n o ’ ’r e s p o n s e st ol a g2i t e m s
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interactions between group and electrode. The ANOVA
for the ‘‘no’’ responses to lag 48 items showed an effect
of group for the first interval [F(1,22) = 4.61, MSE =
19.94, p = .043], but not the second [F(1,22) = 1.42,
MSE = 47.46, p = .246], third, or fourth [Fs(1,22) < 1];
there were no interactions between group and elec-
trode. The effect of group in the first interval is present
because the brain activity associated with correct rejec-
tion of the lag 48 items was more positive for the word
group than the picture group.
In summary, these ERP analyses of the separate item
types demonstrate significant differences in brain activity
between the word and picture groups for the novel
items, supporting our hypothesis that the picture
group’s use of the distinctiveness heuristic changed
their retrieval orientation relative to that of the word
group. Although we have, therefore, answered the
primary question of this study, an additional question
remains unanswered. How does the neural difference in
retrieval orientation between the groups explain the
behavioral difference in their performance? As discussed
Figure 2. Grand-average ERP plots for midline electrodes for each item type (correct responses to study, novel, lag 2, and lag 48 items) by
group (word vs. picture encoding). Positive is plotted down, tics are every 200 msec. The bar indicates the intervals of interest (1 = 150–300 msec;
2 = 300–550 msec; 3 = 550–1000 msec; 4 = 1000–2000 msec).
Figure 3. Topographic distributions of ERP differences between word and picture groups for correct rejection of novel items by interval.
Budson et al. 1185by Herron and Rugg (2003), we suspected that the
answer might be related to electrophysiological differ-
ences between item types being present in different
intervals for the word and picture groups.
ERP Analyses of the Separate Groups by
Item Types
In order to ascertain which interval or intervals were
related to the ability of each group (word or picture) to
distinguish between the different item types, we next
examined the word and picture groups separately for
each interval across all four item types. Effect sizes (h
2)
are also reported in these analyses to obtain a measure
of the relative importance of the different processing
used by the groups to separate the item types as indexed
during different temporal intervals.
Word Group
An ANOVA with item type (correct responses to study,
novel, lag 2, lag 48), and electrode (Fz, Cz, Pz) as within-
subject variables for the word group in the first inter-
val yielded no effect of item type and no interaction
(Table 2 and Figure 4). The analysis of the second in-
terval revealed an effect of item type and an Item type  
Electrode interaction. In the third interval, there was
no effect of item type (Figure 5); there was a trend
toward the interaction. The fourth interval revealed an
effect of item type and no interaction.
Picture Group
An analogous ANOVA for the picture group in the first
interval found no effect of item type and no interaction
(Table 2 and Figure 4). The analysis of the second in-
terval revealed an effect of item type and an Item type  
Electrode interaction. In contrast to that of the word
group, the analysis of the third interval for the picture
group revealed a robust effect of item type (Figure 5) in
addition to an Item type   Electrode interaction. For the
picture group, the analysis of the fourth interval showed
an effect of item type and no interaction.
In brief, these analyses show that although distinct
brain activity was present for the different item types in
both the word and picture groups for the second and
fourth intervals, only the picture group showed differ-
ences in the magnitude of the electrophysiological
responses for the different item types in the third
interval (Table 2 and Figures 4 and 5). Further, the
effect sizes show that for the word group the largest
difference in brain activity between item types was
present in the fourth interval, whereas for the picture
group the largest difference in brain activity between
item types was present in the third interval. The sub-
stantial difference between the groups’ ability to distin-
guish the item types in the third interval is supported by
a 2 (group: picture vs. word)   4 (item type: correct
responses to study, novel, lag 2, lag 48)   3 (electrode:
Fz, Cz, Pz) ANOVA which yielded a Group   Item type
interaction [F(3,66) = 6.05, MSE = 10.78, p = .002].
[The analogous ANOVAs for the first, second, and fourth
intervals did not show such an interaction, Fs(3,66) <
1.2.]
DISCUSSION
Our behavioral data revealed that participants who
studied pictures along with auditory words showed
lower rates of false recognition compared with those
who studied visual and auditory words, consistent with
previous studies (Budson, Dodson, Daffner, et al., 2005;
Budson, Dodson, Vatner, et al., 2005; Dodson &
Schacter, 2002a, 2002b; Schacter, Israel, et al., 1999).
Schacter and colleagues have argued that this reduction
of false recognition is attributable to the use of a
distinctiveness heuristic. To evaluate how the distinc-
Table 2. ANOVA Results of Within-Group ERP Analyses for
Each Latency Interval
Group, Effect, Interval F (df) MSE p 
2
Word
Effect of item type (3,33)
First interval <1 >.300 <.1
Second interval 3.52 9.85 .041 .242
Third interval 1.18 11.58 .328 .097
Fourth interval 7.55 7.47 .002 .407
Item type   Electrode (6,66)
First interval 1.32 2.51 .287 .107
Second interval 5.10 2.68 .016 .317
Third interval 2.42 1.75 .083 .180
Fourth interval <0.1 <.01
Picture
Effect of item type (3,33)
First interval 1.45 5.69 .252 .116
Second interval 8.78 11.37 <.0005 .444
Third interval 14.03 11.53 <.0005 .561
Fourth interval 3.79 9.04 .030 .256
Item type   Electrode (6,66)
First interval 2.06 0.773 .134 .158
Second interval 6.45 1.21 .002 .370
Third interval 4.61 1.21 .006 .295
Fourth interval 1.27 1.58 .286 .103
1186 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 17, Number 8tiveness heuristic alters the way the brain processes
items, we recorded ERPs at test. We suspected that the
distinctiveness heuristic could be understood as a par-
ticular retrieval orientation in which participants may
engage at test following picture encoding at study,
consistent with previous work (Herron & Rugg, 2003;
Robb & Rugg, 2002). Following Rugg and Wilding
(2000), we hypothesized that if the picture group used
a different retrieval orientation than the word group,
then the neural correlates of these differences should be
manifest even for the unstudied, novel items. If, on the
other hand, the differences between picture and word
encoding are solely due to item-specific recollection
(rather than a different retrieval orientation), then any
ERP differences observed should be present only in
actually studied items, and not in novel items.
We found that ERP differences were present between
those who studied pictures versus those who studied
words for both study and novel items (Figures 1, 2, and
3), consistent with the idea first suggested by Robb and
Rugg (2002) that the distinctiveness heuristic may be
understood as a type of retrieval orientation which
participants may engage in at test following picture
encoding at study.
1 To understand the way in which
this change in retrieval orientation altered how the
groups distinguished between different item types, we
next analyzed the effect of item type for the word and
picture groups separately for each time interval. These
results showed that the largest effect of item type was
present in the third interval for the picture group (h
2 =
.561) and in the fourth interval for the word group (h
2 =
.407) (Table 2, Figures 4 and 5). Highlighting these
differences between the groups, effects of item type
were smallest for the picture group in the fourth inter-
val, and lacking altogether for the word group in the
third interval (Table 2).
Linking our intervals to previously described ERP
components may help us to understand the differences
in the retrieval orientation used by the picture and word
groups. We divided our ERP waves into intervals based
Figure 5. Topographic distributions of ERP differences between
correct responses to lag 48 and novel items for the third interval
(550–1000 msec) by group (word vs. picture encoding).
Figure 4. Grand-average ERP
plots for midline electrodes for
each group (word vs. picture
encoding) by item type
(correct responses to study,
novel, lag 2, and lag 48 items).
Positive is plotted down, tics
are every 200 msec. The bar
indicates the intervals of
interest (1 = 150–300 msec;
2 = 300–550 msec;
3 = 550–1000 msec;
4 = 1000–2000 msec).
Budson et al. 1187upon previous ERP studies of recognition memory that
have identified an early P200 component that is both
repetition and modality sensitive and may be related to
implicit perceptual processing (Henson, Rylands, Ross,
Vuilleumeir, & Rugg, 2004; Rugg & Allan, 2000), a fronto-
central N400-like component associated with ‘‘knowing’’
or familiarity (Curran & Cleary, 2003; Curran et al., 2001;
Curran, 2000; Duzel, Yonelinas, Mangun, Heinze, &
Tulving, 1997; but see also Yovel & Paller, 2004, for
another view of the N400), a parietal component be-
lieved to reflect brain processes related to recollec-
tion (Curran & Cleary, 2003; Goldmann et al., 2003;
Curran et al., 2001; Nessler, Mecklinger, & Penney, 2001;
Curran, 2000; Duzel et al., 1997; Johnson, Nolde, et al.,
1997), and a late, frontally based component thought to
reflect postretrieval processing when the contents of
memory must be evaluated for particular features,
source information, and other details (Curran & Cleary,
2003; Goldmann et al., 2003; Curran et al., 2001; Nessler
et al., 2001; Ranaganath & Paller, 2000; Rugg & Allan,
2000; Allan, Wilding, & Rugg, 1998; Wilding & Rugg,
1996). Given our results and these studies, we think it
likely that our first interval is measuring this P200
component that may be related to implicit perceptual
processing, our second interval (showing the most
negativity in the frontal electrode Fz) is measuring this
N400-like component, our third interval (which shows
the most positivity in the parietal electrode Pz) is
measuring this same parietal effect, and our fourth
interval (which shows the most positivity in the frontal
electrode Fz) is measuring the late frontal effect.
Having placed our ERP intervals within a broader
context, we propose the following explanation. Partic-
ipants in the picture group adopted the metacognitive
strategy of the distinctiveness heuristic at test, using the
rule of thumb, ‘‘if I had seen this item at study, I would
remember the picture.’’ This metacognitive strategy led
to a retrieval orientation in which these participants in
the picture group were able to rely upon recollection
(reflected by the parietal component) to determine
whether a test item had been studied. Participants in
the word group, on the other hand, were less able to
rely upon recollection to determine whether an item
had been studied; these participants needed to engage
in additional postretrieval processing (reflected by the
late frontal component) to determine if an item had
appeared on the study list rather than previously on
the test list.
2 Close inspection of Figure 4 supports
this interpretation. For the picture group, there are
clear differences at Pz between all item types in the
third interval (550–1000 msec), and very little, if any,
differences between item types in the fourth interval
(1000–2000 msec). By contrast, in the word group the
only difference between item types present at Pz in the
third interval is between lag 2 and the others; there are
no observable differences here between study, novel,
and lag 48 items. There are, however, observable differ-
ences for the word group between item types in the
fourth interval.
Thus, the present study suggests that the distinctive-
ness heuristic is a retrieval orientation that facilitates or
encourages reliance upon recollection to differentiate
between the different item types. A different retrieval
orientation is used by the word group in this paradigm.
Having no such heuristic to use, recollection alone fails
to distinguish the different test items. Participants in the
word group must instead engage additional postretrieval
processes, such as source monitoring, reflected by the
late frontal ERP component.
Although the ERP differences between groups for
novel items indicates that the picture group used a
different retrieval orientation than the word group, it
does not imply that recollection of studied items was
equal between the two groups. After all, the distinc-
tiveness heuristic is based upon subjects’ metamemo-
rial belief that they will remember pictures better than
words, and of course, this belief is correct: All other
factors being equal, pictures are better recollected than
words. The picture group clearly took advantage of this
richer recollection to distinguish between items, as
reflected by the parietal component (discussed above).
As expected, the distinctiveness heuristic allowed the
picture group to reject more unstudied items than the
word group, reflecting a more conservative response
bias in the picture group. Differences in familiarity
(reflected by the N400) were also present for item
types in both the word and picture groups, and may
additionally contribute to the ERP differences observed
between groups. It is likely that compared to studying
words, studying pictures improves recollection of the
study items and changes the subjects’ retrieval orien-
tation, and that these differences in recollection and
retrieval orientation in turn lead to changes in the
subjects’ response bias. The present study cannot
determine the exact contributions of retrieval orienta-
tion, recollection, familiarity, and response criteria to
the ERP differences observed between the word and
picture groups. Future ERP studies of the distinctive-
ness heuristic using paradigms that attempt to equate
recollection, familiarity, and bias between the word
and picture groups (such as that by Gallo, Weiss,
& Schacter, 2004) will be helpful in teasing apart
these issues.
The findings of the first interval deserve discussion.
There were reliable differences between the word and
picture groups in this interval for novel (along with
study and lag 48) items (Figures 1 and 2). By contrast,
however, there were no differences between item types
in the within-group analyses for the separate word and
picture groups in this interval (Figure 4). Together,
these findings suggest that whereas the retrieval orien-
tation of the groups differed in this early period of brain
activity, activity in this interval did not aid subjects in
their discrimination between item types. These findings
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our first interval reflects implicit perceptual processing,
then our results suggest that top-down modulation of
this perceptual processing may occur, and may differ
depending upon the retrieval orientation of the subject.
The ERP responses to lag 2 items are also noteworthy.
As mentioned above, even the word group shows differ-
ences between lag 2 and the other items in the third
interval, and lag 2 items show the greatest positivity in
the third interval for both the word and picture groups.
Because our third interval is similar to the parietal ERP
component, this finding suggests that recollection may
play a prominent role in identification of these very
recently seen lag 2 items, consistent with previous
studies (Dodson & Schacter, 2002a, 2002b). Recollection
of the source, or item-specific, information of seeing the
repeated new words earlier on the test may serve as a
‘‘recall-to-reject’’ mechanism, reducing false recognition
when the new words repeat after short lag intervals
(Rotello, Macmillan, & Van Tassel, 2000; Rotello & Heit,
1999; Clark & Gronlund, 1996). If rejecting a lag 2 item
involves recollection of the recently seen word rather
than recollection of the study items, then it would be
expected that both picture and word groups should
show similar brain activity and performance for the lag
2 items. Participants in the picture and word groups do,
in fact, show near-identical brain activity (Figure 2) and
similar performance (Table 1) for the lag 2 items (see
also Results).
The idea that our young subjects used a recall-to-
reject mechanism to reduce false recognition to lag 2
items is consistent with work by Dywan and colleagues.
In their ERP studies using very similar repetition-lag
paradigms (with words only), Dywan, Segalowitz, and
Arsenault (2002) and Dywan, Segalowitz, and Webster
(1998) found that young adults were faster at rejecting
lag 6 items compared with novel items, presumably due
to a recall-to-reject mechanism. The ERP results of these
studies, however, differed somewhat from those of our
word group and, in fact, bore more resemblance to
those of our picture group in some instances. For
example, in the study of Dywan, Segalowitz, and Arse-
nault, study items were more positive than novel items
from 400 to 800 msec; such a difference was found in
our picture group but not in our word group. This and
other differences between our results and theirs may
simply reflect the difference in the number of study and
test items (100 and 300 vs. 25 and 131) and lags (2 and
48 vs. 6) used. Another more interesting possibility is
that, by instructing the subjects to ‘‘read each word out
loud’’—rather than syllable count, as in our paradigm—
they may have actually encouraged participants to use
the distinctiveness heuristic to distinguish studied ver-
sus lag items (in addition to the greater recollection that
their encoding task presumably engendered). That is,
subjects may have used the rule of thumb, ‘‘if I had read
this word out loud, I would remember it,’’ as occurred in
the study of Dodson and Schacter (2001) when some
subjects said aloud target words on study lists compared
with others who heard the target words. Thus, the ERP
results from 400 to 800 msec in the studies of Dywan,
Segalowitz, and Arsenault (2002) and Dywan, Segalowitz,
and Webster (1998) may have been attributable to
participants relying on recollection to distinguish items
types because of the distinctiveness heuristic and the
retrieval orientation that it facilitates.
The findings in Figure 3, showing the differences
between the word and picture groups for the correct
rejection of novel items (reflecting the topography of
the difference between the waves in Figure 1), deserve
comment. Although the differences in the first inter-
val are mainly midline without a significant anterior–
posterior gradient, the word group shows greater
positivity in their brain responses to the novel items
than the picture group in midline frontal and central
regions during the second and third intervals (sup-
ported by the near-significant Group   Electrode inter-
action in the second interval and subsequent post hoc
tests). Because the electrical brain activity of the first
interval did not help subjects to distinguish between
item types, and there was no difference between groups
for the fourth interval, it may be that the fronto-central
difference of activity in the second and third intervals
represents the neural correlate of the distinctiveness
heuristic. Although one cannot draw reliable neuroana-
tomical inferences regarding the neural generators of
ERP data, it is interesting to note that a number of
studies have also suggested that the frontal lobes may be
important in metacognitive processes including the dis-
tinctiveness heuristic. Johnson and colleagues have sug-
gested that right frontal regions, in particular, may
support judgments based on qualities which are rela-
tively easily assessed (such as perceptual detail or famil-
iarity), and that left or bilateral frontal regions are
needed for more systematic judgments when more
careful analysis of the memory is needed (Mitchell,
Johnson, Raye, & Green, 2004; Johnson & Raye, 1998;
Johnson, Kounios, & Nolde, 1996).
3 In their review of
the neuroimaging literature, Fletcher and Henson
(2001) suggested that the anterior frontal cortex (the
anterior edge of the inferior frontal gyrus) is important
in selecting goals and coordinating other brain regions
to achieve those goals, and its activation is commonly
seenduringtheadoptionofspecific strategies ofmemory
retrieval to assist in goal-directed behavior. Two other
reviews suggest that midfrontal brain regions may be
particularly important for metacognition (Fernandez-
Duque et al., 2000; Shimamura, 2000). Lastly, Budson,
Dodson, Vatner, et al. (2005) found that patients with
frontallobelesionswereunabletousethedistinctiveness
heuristic to reduce their false recognition.
The present study helps to explain the findings of
previous reports investigating the use of the distinctive-
ness heuristic in different patient populations. Budson,
Budson et al. 1189Dodson, Daffner, et al. (2005) studied patients with
Alzheimer’s disease, and Weiss, Dodson, Goff, Schacter,
and Heckers (2002) studied patients with schizophre-
nia. Each of these patient groups was able to use the
distinctiveness heuristic to reduce their false recogni-
tion to an extent similar to the control groups. However,
compared to those who studied words, the patients
who studied pictures showed lower levels of true re-
cognition in addition to their reduced false recogni-
tion. To understand these findings, we must first note
that both patients with Alzheimer’s disease and those
with schizophrenia are known to show impaired recol-
lection due to medial-temporal lobe dysfunction (Smith
& Knight, 2002; Heckers et al., 1998). As expected, pa-
tients in both the picture and word conditions thus
show impaired recollection of the studied items. In the
present study, we have suggested that the distinctive-
ness heuristic occurs because participants in picture
group use recollection alone to determine if test items
were studied—only test items which engender recollec-
tion of pictorial information support a positive recog-
nition decision. Because the patients show impaired
recollection of this pictorial information, they will most
likely reject large numbers of study items that are not
recollected at test. Of course, the word group also
shows impaired recollection of the study items, but
because they do not demand access to recollection of
detailed study information to make their recognition
decision—relying instead on familiarity and postretrieval
processes—they will not reject an item simply because
they cannot recollect it. Thus, patients with Alzheimer’s
disease and schizophrenia in the picture condition show
lower levels of both false and true recognition compared
with those in the word condition because those in the
picture condition rely upon a recollection system which
is dysfunctional.
Our investigation of the distinctiveness heuristic
found that ERPs to novel items were more negative in
the picture versus word encoding condition, consistent
with previous work by Herron and Rugg (2003) and
Robb and Rugg (2002). These studies, using within-
subjects manipulations, demonstrated that retrieval ori-
entation can be altered by whether words or pictures
were the sought-for-modality. The present study has
expanded our knowledge of retrieval orientation in
several ways. First, we showed that retrieval orientation
can be altered using a between-subjects word versus
picture encoding manipulation. Second, unlike Herron
a n dR u g g ,a n dR o b ba n dR u g g ,w h ou s e dd i f f e r e n t
encoding tasks in the picture and word conditions in
an effort to maximize the differences between the con-
ditions, we used an identical encoding task for the two
conditions in our study. This task congruity enabled us
to observe changes in retrieval orientation solely related
to a change in the study material. Lastly, our study has
shown additional ways in which a change in retrieval
orientation can impact performance—by facilitating the
reduction of false recognition to novel items even when
the novel items are repeated at test.
In conclusion, we have shown that the distinctiveness
heuristic can be understood as an adoption of a partic-
ular retrieval orientation in which the participants in the
picture encoding condition depend upon using recol-
lection to make their decisions regarding the old–new
status of a test item. By contrast, participants in the
more standard word encoding condition require the
engagement of additional postretrieval processes to
make their test decisions. Because participants in the
picture encoding condition were able to use this retriev-
al orientation to reduce their false recognition, future
studies investigating the distinctiveness heuristic and
retrieval orientation may be able to provide strategies
to enable healthy and memory impaired individuals to
reduce false memories and thereby improve their lives.
METHODS
Participants
Thirty-one right-handed, native English-speaking par-
ticipants (15 women; mean age 21.5 years, range 20–
27 years; mean years of education 15.0, range 14–18)
were recruited from Harvard University, Cambridge, MA,
by e-mail, fliers, and word of mouth. All participants
were screened for serious medical conditions and were
healthy. Participants were paid US$25/hr. The study was
approved by the human subjects committees of Harvard
University and Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Boston,
MA. Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants. All participants were tested during one
sitting at Brigham and Women’s Hospital. Data were
reported and analyzed from 24 participants (10 women).
[Seven participants’ data were rejected because of less
than 16 artifact-free trials per condition (4 participants),
behavioral performance outside of 3 standard deviations
compared to the other participants (2 participants), or
they did not follow task instructions (1 participant).]
Paradigm Materials and Design
The stimuli consisted of 200 Snodgrass and Vanderwart
(1980) pictures and their corresponding labels. The
stimuli were divided into four lists of 50 stimuli each.
Each of the lists were compiled so that they had similar
mean ratings for picture familiarity (average 3.52 out of
5), picture complexity (average 2.73 out of 5), and word
frequency (average 32.74). Participants were randomly
assigned to a counterbalanced arrangement of the lists
(A, B, C, or D). Although all participants heard the
auditory label at study, half of the participants also
saw the corresponding picture, and the other half saw
the word visually presented. All participants were pre-
sented with both visual and auditory words at test. One
hundred items (two lists) were presented at study and
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(the other two lists) were new at test and served as the
novel items. Fifty of those novel items (one of the lists
used as novel) were presented again at test after an
intervening lag of two items from their initial presenta-
tion (lag 2 items); the other 50 of the novel items (the
other list that was used as novel) were presented again
at test after an intervening lag of 48 items from their
initial presentation (lag 48 items). Thus, 300 items were
presented at test. Visual word items were presented
in white against a black background in Arial font size
40. Snodgrass and Vanderwart pictures were black on
a white background. Stimuli were presented to the
participants by the StimMixed program run from an
Intel Pentium computer and were viewed on a 16-in.
color monitor with 640   480 screen resolution. The
stimuli were centered and encompassed the entire
monitor screen. The auditory words were presented
through headphones at the same time the visual stimuli
were presented.
ERP Materials and Method
ERPs were recorded from participants through the use
of an electrode cap (Electro-Cap International, Eaton,
OH), which held the 29 tin electrodes to the scalp.
The electrode sites consisted of 3 midline (Fz, Cz, Pz)
and 26 lateral sites (arranged in 4 coronal rows from
anterior to posterior sites (a: F7/8, AF7/8, FP1/2; b: T3/4,
FC5/6, F3/4, FC1/2; c: CP5/6, C3/4, CP1/2; d: T5/6, P3/4,
O1/2). These sites were all referenced to the left
mastoid and the impedance between each recording
site and the reference site was reduced to less than
15 k. Three tin biopotential electrodes (referenced to
the left mastoid) were placed to monitor eye move-
ments: one beneath the left eye (LE) (to check for eye
blinks and vertical eye movements) and the others at
the outer canthi of the participants’ right and left eyes
(HE) (to check for lateral eye movements). There was
an electrode (A2) placed over the left mastoid in order
to serve as a reference for the 32 tin electrodes as well
as a final electrode (A1) placed over the right mastoid
(referenced to the left) to monitor asymmetric mastoid
activity; none was found. To increase conductance, all
electrodes were filled with Quik-Gel Conductive Gel
( N e u r o s o f t ,E lP a s o ,T X ) .T h ee l e c t r o e n c e p h a l o g r a m
(EEG)wasrecordedonanSAInstrumentationbioelectric
amplifier (Encinitas, CA; model B&W 32 BA) and contin-
uously digitized (200 Hz) by a PC-compatible microcom-
puter that yielded 2560 msec of data from each electrode
site, beginning 100 msec before stimulus onset. Partic-
ipants were seated in a dimly lit, sound-attenuated room,
5 ft in front of the computer screen. Participants re-
sponded ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ to items at study and test using
a joystick.
For the study phase, all participants were instructed to
engage in a syllable counting task by answering ‘‘yes’’ or
‘‘no’’ to the question, ‘‘Does the item consist of more
than two syllables?’’ when cued by a plus sign. Partic-
ipants were not informed that they would be tested later
for their memory of these study items. At test, partic-
ipants were instructed to perform a ‘‘yes/no’’ task in
which they were instructed to answer the question ‘‘Was
this item present in the syllable counting task?’’ Partic-
ipants who had studied pictures were informed that they
would see visual words corresponding to the pictures,
whereas participants who studied visual words were
instructed that they would see visual words again.
Participants were instructed that there would be novel
words on the test as well, and they were specifically told
that all the novel words would be repeated.
Both study and test items were presented for
1500 msec, followed by 500 msec of blank screen, fol-
lowed by the plus sign that cued participants to respond.
The plus sign remained until the participants responded
and was then followed by 500 msec of blank screen, after
which a focus point (asterisk) remained on the screen
for 1500 msec. After another 500 msec of blank screen,
the next item was presented. Participants were in-
structed to try not to blink or move their eyes while
the study and test items were on the screen. There were
several pauses during the experiment to allow data to be
transferred to the hard drive and to allow the participant
to blink as needed and rest their eyes.
Data Analysis
Continuous raw EEG data were recorded. EEG epochs
for the two different groups (word and picture) and four
different item types (correct responses to study, novel,
lag 2, and lag 48 items) were averaged separately. Trials
with either excessive eye movements (>50 AV peak-to-
peak amplitude) in either of the outer canthi channels
(left or right) or amplifier blocking were excluded from
data analysis. For trials with excessive eye blinks (>50 AV
peak-to-peak amplitude in the channel below the left
eye), a blink correction program (Dale, 1994) was
employed that computed the impact of the blink on
the waveforms in each channel. The ERP data were
analyzed by dividing the wave into four frequently
studied components of a recognition memory test ERP
wave, the P200, the N400, the parietal component, and
the late frontal component (e.g., Curran et al., 2001).
The particular temporal intervals used for defining P200,
N400, parietal, and late frontal effects were determined
by visual inspection after reviewing the individual ERP
plots for all subjects. The first interval (P200) was
defined as 150 to 300 msec after stimulus onset, the
second interval (N400) from 300 to 550 msec, the third
interval (parietal component) from 550 to 1000 msec,
and the fourth interval (late frontal component) from
1000 to 2000 msec. Mean amplitudes were calculated for
each interval and used in the ERP analyses. Amplitudes
were measured with respect to the average of the
Budson et al. 1191100-msec prestimulus baseline. Data were analyzed
using repeated-measures ANOVAs using SPSS 10.0.5
(SPSS, Chicago, IL). The Greenhouse–Geisser proce-
dure was used for all ANOVAs with greater than one
numerator degree of freedom.
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Notes
1. Note that the ERP waves for the lag 2 items were almost
exactly the same for the word and picture groups (Figure 2),
suggesting that the differences between the groups observed
for the study and novel items cannot be due to subject
variability or other nonspecific factors.
2. Note that participants in both word and picture groups
also found some test items more familiar than others, reflected
by differences in the N400 component.
3. Note that Johnson and colleagues refer to judgments
which are easily assessed as ‘‘heuristic’’ judgments. This
heuristic facilitates ‘‘old’’ and ‘‘new’’ responses to items which
may be easily judged based upon their familiarity, perceptual
details, and so forth. This kind of a heuristic is somewhat
different from the distinctiveness heuristic which allows
participants to easily respond ‘‘new’’ to items for which they
do not recollect the picture at study.
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